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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT OF COURT

N Craig v. Harney' the United States Supreme Court, overruling the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 2 held that the
conviction for contempt of newspapermen who published articles
vehemently attacking a county judge and his ruling in a suit still

pending on motion for new trial, violated the freedom of press
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' Applying the
"clear and present danger" test the Court held that the mere
vehemence of the language used is not the measure of the power
to punish for contempt, but rather that there must be an imminent
threat to the administration of justice.
Undoubtedly the Texas court found the publications in question
to be of such a vehement and acrid nature as seriously to raise the
question of a clear and present danger to the due and orderly
administration of justice. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the
United States concluded otherwise believing that these publications
in their setting and given all the vehemence which the Texas court
gave to them, failed to meet the clear and present danger test.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that it
took more imagination than the court possessed "to find in this
rather sketchy and one-sided report of a case any imminent or

serious threat to a judge of reasonable fortitude." 4
In a battering dissent that comports with common sense and
reality Justice Jackson stated:
"From our sheltered position. fortified by life tenure and other de.
fenses to judicial independence, it is easy to say that this local judge
1 331 U. S. 367 (1947).
2
Ex Parte Craig 193 S. W. (2d) 178 (Tex. Ct. Cr. App. 1940).
3 A resume of the publications in question is set forth in Appendix to Opinion of
Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 378-383 (1947).
' Id. at 375.
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ought to have shown more fortitude... but I am not so confident that

we would be indifferent if a news monopoly in our entire jurisdiction
should perpetrate this kind of an attack on us."

Since both the Texas court and the United States Supreme Court
applied the "clear and present danger" test, it cannot be said that
the Craig case changed in any manner the law of contempt. It is
submitted, howeverj that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
recognized prerogative to make an independent examination of the

facts when it is asserted that a person has been deprived by a state
court of a fundamental constitutional right' has, in this case,
merely substituted its own opinion for that of the Texas court and
thereby denied the right of a state to determine for itself what acts
and course of conduct constitute a clear and present danger to the
orderly administration of justice in its own courts.
PRIVILEGES OF LEGISLATORS

In a petition for mandamus and prohibition against a district
judge, the Supreme Court of Texas, in Mora v. Ferguson,' sustained the validity of Article 2168a' which makes it mandatory
to grant a continuance to a party if he or his attorney is a member
of the legislature.
The defense attorney in a rape case was a member of the Texas
Legislature and filed a motion, eight days before the legislature
was to convene, for a continuance based on this statute which was
overruled. In support of this ruling the district judge attacked the
constitutionality of the statute, contending it undertook to add to
the privileges and immunities given members of the legislature
by express constitutional provision; and that the statute was an
unwarranted invasion by the legislature of the functions of the
judiciary in that the circumstances under which the attorney had
been granted a previous continuance estopped him to claim a fur5 Id. at 397.
6 See Mr. Justice Douglas' statement and authorities cited at 373.
7 145 Tex. 498, 199 S. W. (2d) 759 (1947).
a Tx. Rzy. Gy. STAr. Aiow. (Vernon's, 1925) at.2168a.
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ther continuance based on this statute. To reverse the district
court's ruling would amount to an imposition upon the court of a
rule of procedure different from the ordinary rule of waiver and
estoppeL
The statute was sustained on the broad ground that it promotes
the public interest and welfare, and the court gave no indication
as to what conduct, if any, would operate as a waiver or estoppel
to assert the provisions of this statute. Inasmuch as its provisions
are made expressly mandatory by the legislature, it is believed
the courts will regard no conduct as working an estoppel, for the
public interest involved would seem to preclude any such
possibility.
THE HOME RULE AMENDMENT

Passage by the 50th Legislature of the Firemen's and Police.
men's Civil Service Act9 and the Firemen's and Policemen's
Compensation Act 0 represents a further encroachment upon the
power of Home Rule cities to regulate their local affairs.
It will be remembered that in 1912 the so-called Home Rule
Amendment" to the Texas Constitution was adopted in order to
permit cities of more than five thousand inhabitants to provide
their own charters and to pass ordinances regulating local matters, without the necessity of first obtaining an express grant of
authority from the legislature. The only limitation which this
Amendment places upon the power of the cities to legislate with
respect to local matters is:
"... no charter or ordinance shall contain any provision inconsistent
with the Constitution
of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the
State."
Legislature of the

The cities have taken the position that the provision refers to
legislation which existed at the time the amendment was adopted

a T.

VEzNoN's ANN. CIv. STAT. (Supp. 1947) art. 1269m.
IoTE. PEN. CODE (Supp. 1947) arL 1583-2.
t

mT
. CoNsT. Art. 1, 1 2.

19481
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and not to subsequent legislation. This construction, however, has
not been accepted by the courts, and it would seem that the meaning of the provision is no longer open to question: the legislature
may pass laws regulating local affairs of Home Rule cities so long
as it does so by enactment of general, as distinguished from
2
special, laws.'
The new Firemen's and Policemen's Compensation Act contains
a provision making responsible city officials liable to heavy fines
for failure to pay the prescribed salaries."8 It would seem that by
attaching this penal provision the legislature is, in effect, compelling the cities to levy and collect taxes for local 'purposes, a power
which it cannot exercise directly.
The constitutionality of the new Firemen's and Policemen's
Civil Service Act has already been assailed by the City of Fort
Worth in a suit now pending, the city taking the position that the
effect of the act is to nullify all provisions contained in its charter
respecting its fire and police departments and to substitute therefor
the provisions enacted by the legislature.
It seems reasonable to believe that if the people, in adopting
the Home Rule Amendment, did not intend to exclude the legislature altogether from the field of city government, at least they
intended that it produce more significant consequences than merely
permitting the cities to exercise home rule only in fields in which
the legislature does not choose to act.
VOTING MACHINES

In Reynolds v. Dallas County"' the Amarillo Court of Civil
Appeals sustained the validity of Article 2 997a known as the

it

City of Beaumont v. Fall, 116 Tex. 314, 291 S. W. 202 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
The Court there state&. "In a word, as long as the State does not, in its Constitution or
by general statute, cover any field of the activity of the cities of this State, any given city
is at liberty to act for itself. But when the State itself steps in and makes a general law
and applies such law to all cities of a certain class, then we submit, that no city of the
same class is authorized, under our Constitution, to enact contrary legislation. If this
principle has not already been adopted as the settled law of this State, then it should be
so understood from this time forward." 116 Tex. 324,291 S. W. 205.

Is Tzx. PEN. Coons (Supp. 1947) art. 1583-2,12.
14 203 S. W. (2d) 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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Voting Machine Law, which permits the commissioners court of
any county in Texas to adopt for use in elections any kind of
voting machine approved by the Secretary of State. An injunction
was sought against Dallas County prohibiting the use of voting
machines to register and record the ballots cast in local and state
elections. Several objections to the statute were urged,"5 the chief
one being that the machines used provide no means for numbering
the ballots cast as required by Article 6, Section 4 of the Constitution." The Court conceded that the constitutional requirement
for the numbering of ballots was mandatory," but decided the
statute was not unconstitutional merely because the machine itself
does not number the ballots, for other methods of numbering could
be utilized. Even though the provisions do not fully meet the constitutional requirement, the remedy was for the legislature and
not for the courts.
PFACEFUL PICKETIm

Two 1947 decisions by different Courts of Civil Appeal deal
with peaceful picketing. In one the facts of the case were found
to justify a prohibition of all picketing, and the other seems to
permit the union to picket, so long as the picketing does not
become effective. While the results of the-zn decisions are similar,
the reasoning and the interpretation of recent United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with peaceful picketing as an aspect
of free speech are diverse.
In InternationalAssn. of Machinists Lodge 1488 v. Downtown
Employees Assn."0 the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals held that
the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs (an
auto company and an association of its employees), showed: (1)
15Allegations were made that the statute was an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power to commissioners courts to suspend the primary and general election laws, and it
was an attempt to convert general laws of the state into special laws.
10 This section requires the legislature to provide for the numbering of ballots.
1?See Woods v. State, 133 Tex. 110,126 S. W. (2d) 4 (1939).
is 204 S. W. (2d) 685 (Tex. Clv. App. 1947).
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peaceful picketing, (2) a loss of thirty-five to forty percent of its
gross business sustained by the company, (3) a loss of over onethird of their pay sustained by the employees, (4) a union contract
sought which required all workers to join the union, (5) a subsisting contract between the auto company and the plaintiff association, completed a day or two before the picketing began, and
(6) a finding made that most of the employees were members of
the plaintiff association. The court held that there was no abuse
of discretion in issuing a temporary injunction based on these
findings. The court relied upon its own opinion in the case of
Carpentersand Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cale,1 which condemned

picketing to cause breach of contract, or to cause the public to
cease trading with a business.
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, in Turner v. Zanes,2 upheld
a permanent injunction against activities in pursuit of a secondary
boycott. Such activities included threatened secondary strike and
threatened secondary picketing, and were directed primarily
against certain common carriers, named co-defendants in the
action, and only secondarily against the plaintiff, a trucking firm
engaged in a dispute with the defendant union. But the court also
approved the portion of the lower court's decree which allowed
primary picketing of the plaintiff's own place of business. The
court approved restrictions upon the primary picketing designed
to insure its peaceful nature, but modified the decree insofar as it
limited the picketing to persuasion and dissuasion of employees,
declaring the defendant's right to publish the facts of the labor
dispute to the general public, in spite of a Texas statute limiting
the purpose of picketing to persuasion of employees and prospective employees. 1
The injunction was approved upon the following grounds: (1)
that secondary boycotts are a violation of Texas anti-trust statutes
19 138 S. W. (2d) 223,227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), second appeal, 149 S. W. (2d) 694,
697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), affirmed 315 U. S. 722 (1942).

20 206 5. W. (2d) 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
21 Tw,. RzV. Civ. STAT. ANN (Vernon, 1925) Art. 5153.
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(the court considered this application of the statutes to have been
approved by the Ritter's Cafe case), and (2) that reasonable restrictions upon peaceful picketing are within the police power of
the state and not violative of the right of free speech. For the latter
conclusion the court relied upon Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in the
Ritter's Cafe case, 2 and Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion
in Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl.2"
One of the restrictions upon the primary picketing, which was
apparently approved, provided that the defendants must remove
their picket line, if it resulted in-the refusal of common carriers
to deliver goods to the plaintiff, until such deliveries were completed. This restriction seems to accomplish the same effect as if
no modification had been made. It may be explained by the court's
emphasis on a common carriers statutory duty to carry goods for
all and sundry.2"
The purpose of the picketing was to obtain a "union shop" contract, but the court did not refer to recent Texas legislation outlawing such a contract apparently because no appeal was taken by
the plaintiff, and the only effect of such legislation would be to
entitle plaintiff to an injunction against all picketing for a union
shop.
The two cases approach the problem of picketing from entirely
different points of views. That of the Galveston court is simply
the old view of the common law that where there is an injury,
there must be a remedy, unless injury is justified. The Dallas court
viewed the common law as definitely changed by recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court enlarging freedom of speech,
but found that the injunction issued by the lower court did not
infringe freedom of speech, when modified so as to permit the
union to publicize the dispute to all, as well as to employees and
prospective employees.
22

315 U. S. 722, 738 (1942).

2" 315 U. S. 769, 776 (1942).
24 Burlington

(1943).

Transportation Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Iowa 135, 12 N. W. (2d) 167
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The attitude of the Dallas court is more nearly in line with
United States Supreme Court decisions, although it may be
doubted that the result reached was much more favorable from the
union's point of view than was the Galveston court's decision, because of the peculiar restriction upon the primary picketing which
provided that the picket line must be removed as soon as it resulted in any action by the common carriers detrimental to the
plaintiffs. u

I.T.

25 For a report of 1947 Texas labor legislation see 2 Somraw

zarwL

J. 79 (1946).

